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Abstract. In this paper, we perform an automated analysis of two de-
vices developed by Yubico: YubiKey, designed to authenticate a user to
network-based services, and YubiHSM, Yubico’s hardware security mod-
ule. Both are analyzed using the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol an-
alyzer. Although previous work has been done applying automated tools
to these devices, to the best of our knowledge there has been no com-
pletely automated analysis to date. This is not surprising, because both
YubiKey and YubiHSM, which make use of cryptographic APIs, involve
a number of complex features: (i) discrete time in the form of Lamport
clocks, (ii) a mutable memory for storing previously seen keys or nonces,
(iii) event-based properties that require an analysis of sequences of ac-
tions, and (iv) reasoning modulo exclusive-or. In this work, we have been
able to both prove properties of YubiKey and find the known attacks on
the YubiHSM, in a completely automated way beyond the capabilities
of previous work in the literature.
1 Introduction
Nowadays there exist several security tokens having the form of a smartcard or
an USB device, which are designed for protecting cryptographic values from an
intruder, e.g, hosting service, email, e-commerce, online banks, etc. They are also
used to ease authentication for the authorized users at a service, e.g., if you are
using a service that verifies your Personal Identification Number (PIN), the same
service should not be used for checking your flights, reading your emails, etc. By
using an Application Programming Interface (API) to separate the service from
the authenticator system, such problems can be prevented.
Yubico is a leading company on open authentication standards and has de-
veloped two core inventions: the YubiKey, a small USB designed to authenticate
a user against network-based services, and the YubiHSM, Yubico’s hardware se-
curity module (HSM). The YubiKey allows for the secure authentication of a
user against network-based services by considering different methods: one-time
password (OTP), public key encryption, public key authentication, and the Uni-
versal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol [5]. YubiKey works by using a secret value
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(i.e., a running counter) and some random values, all encrypted using a 128 bit
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). An important feature of YubiKey is that
it is independent of the operating system and does not require any installation,
because it works with the USB system drivers. YubiHSM is intended to operate
in conjunction with a host application. It supports several modes of operation,
but the key concept is a symmetric scheme where one device at one location
can generate a secure data element in a secure environment. Although the main
application area is for securing YubiKey’s OTP authentication/validation oper-
ations, the use of several generic cryptographic primitives allows a wider range
of applications. The increasing success of YubiKey and YubiHSM has led to its
use by governments, universities and companies like Google, Facebook, Dropbox,
CERN, Bank of America etc., including more than 30,000 customers [3].
Cryptographic Application Programmer Interfaces (Crypto APIs) are com-
monly used to secure interaction between applications and hardware security
module (HSMs), and are both used in YubiKey and YubiHSM. However, many
crypto APIs have been subjected to intruder manipulation to disclose relevant
information, as is the case for YubiHSM. In [14,15], Ku¨nnemann and Steel show
two kinds of attacks on the first released version YubiHSM API: (i) if the in-
truder had access to the server running YubiKey, where AES keys are generated,
then it was able to obtain plaintext in the clear; (ii) even if the intruder had
no access to the server running YubiKey, it could use previous nonces to obtain
AES keys.
This paper is the third in a series using Maude-NPA to analyze cryptographic
APIs; earlier work appeared in [12,13]. We find this problem area one of particu-
lar interest for two reasons. First, these APIs often use exclusive-or and this gives
us the opportunity to explore how well Maude-NPA, which provides support for
the full exclusive-or theory, can be applied to protocols that use exclusive-or.
Secondly, cryptographic APIs offer a number of other challenging features such
as mutable global state, and this allows us to explore how Maude-NPA can be
made to handle global state as well.
In this work we use Maude-NPA [1] for analyzing both YubiKey and Yu-
biHSM. Our analysis was carried out on generation 2 of YubiKey and version
0.9.8 beta of the YubiHSM, as was the analysis of [14]. In order to facilitate com-
parison with earlier work, our formal specifications of YubiKey and YubiHSM
follow those of [14] as closely as possible. Our main contributions are:
1. We have been able to prove secrecy and authentication properties of YubiKey
and to find both attacks on YubiHSM, beyond the capabilities of the earlier
analysis, which was only able to find one, due to limited support for exclusive-
or. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only analysis of YubiKey and
YubiHSM using a protocol analysis tool with a full treatment of exclusive-or.
2. The analysis was completely automatic and either found an attack or termi-
nated with a finite search graph, showing that no attack of that kind exists.
That is, Maude-NPA did not need any human guiding or auxiliary lemmas.
The earlier analysis involved some additional user-defined lemmas in order
to prove one of the properties of YubiKey.
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3. We show in Section 4 how we implemented (i) Lamport clocks, (ii) mutable
memory, and (iii) event-based properties in Maude-NPA, even though the
tool does not support these natively, by making use of Maude-NPA’s capa-
bilities for protocol composition and reasoning modulo associativity. These
techniques should be applicable to other protocols with similar properties.
2 The YubiKey Device
The YubiKey USB device [24] is an authentication device capable of generat-
ing One Time Passwords (OTPs). The YubiKey connects to a USB port and
identifies itself as a standard USB keyboard, which allows it to be used in most
computing environments using the system’s native drivers.
We will focus on the YubiKey OTP mode, a mode that uses a button phys-
ically located on the YubiKey. When this button is pressed, it emits a string
that can be verified only once against a server in order to receive the permis-
sion to access a service. Furthermore, a request for a new authentication token
is triggered also by touching the YubiKey button. As a result of this request,
some counters that are stored on the device are incremented and some random
values are generated in order to create a fresh 16-byte plaintext. An OTP has
the following concatenated fields [23]:
The YubiKey authentication server accepts an OTP only if it decrypts under
the correct AES key into a valid secret value containing a counter larger than
the last accepted counter. The token counter is used as a Lamport clock [16] to
determine the order of events in a distributed concurrent system.
The authentication protocol of YubiKey involves three roles: (i) the user,
(ii) the service, and (iii) the verification server. The user can have access to the
service if it provides its own valid OTP generated by the YubiKey; its validity
is verified by the verification server as explained before. Figure 1 [18] is a simple
example of a YubiKey API execution, where the three roles are as follows: the
user (Browser), the service (YubiCloud), and the verification server running the
YubiKey API.
The YubiKey OTP generation scheme can be described by the following
interaction sequence.
1. The initialization of the YubiKey device takes place. A fresh public ID (pid),
secret ID (sid) and YubiKey key (k) are generated. Any interaction be-
tween the YubiKey and the server will involve all three elements pid, sid
and k. There are also two token counters, one stored on the Server and
another stored on the YubiKey. The server saves information using the no-
tation SharedKey(pid,k) and Server(pid,sid,token counter), whereas
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Fig. 1. YubiKey OTP Validation Flow
the YubiKey saves information using Y(pid,sid) and YubiCounter(pid,token
counter).
2. The YubiKey is plugged in. Every time the YubiKey is plugged in, the Yu-
biKey token counter must be increased. However, we consider a compromised
scenario in which the intruder could produce all counter values as in [14],
thus adding a new token counter as an input to the command and checking
that it must be bigger than the old stored token counter. Figure 2 shows
a graphical representation of the plugin event, including the input, output,
and saved information.
Fig. 2. YubiKey Plugin API Command
3. The user pushes the YubiKey OTP generation button and generates a byte
string formed by the sid, the YubiKey token counter, and a random number.
The byte string is encrypted using a symmetric encryption operator and
the saved key k. The YubiKey token counter is also increased. According
to the compromised scenario, the YubiKey token counter must be provided
as input. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the button-pressing
event, including the input, output, and saved information.
4. Upon reception of the generated OTP string, the basic verification steps are:
4.1 The byte string is decrypted, and if it is not valid the OTP is rejected.
4.2 The token counter stored in the OTP is compared with the server token
counter. If smaller than or equal to the server token counter, the received
OTP is rejected as a replay. According to the compromised scenario, the
server token counter must be provided as input.
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Fig. 3. YubiKey Press Button Command
4.3 A successful login must have been preceded by a button press for the
same counter value, and there is not a second distinct login for this
counter value. In this paper we omit this check and show that this prop-
erty is always guaranteed, assuming that the checks on the byte string
and token counter succeed.
4.4 If all the checks succeed, the token counter stored in the OTP is stored
as the server token counter and the OTP is accepted as valid.
Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the login event, including the
input, output, and saved information.
Fig. 4. YubiKey Login Command
In [14,15], Ku¨nnemann and Steel were able to prove several properties:
(a) Absence of replay attacks, i.e., there are no two distinct logins that accept
the same counter value.
(b) Correspondence between pressing the button on a YubiKey and a successful
login. In other words, a successful login must have been preceded by a button
pressed for the same counter value. Furthermore, there is no second distinct
login for this counter value.
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(c) Counter values are different over time, where a successful login invalidates
previous OTPs. Note that the verification of this property in Tamarin in-
volved additional user-defined lemmas.
3 The YubiHSM Device
Yubico also distributes a USB device that works as an application-specific Hard-
ware Security Module (HSM) to protect the YubiKey AES keys. The YubiHSM [25]
stores a very limited number of AES keys in a way that the server can use them
to perform cryptographic operations without the key values ever appearing in
the server’s memory. The YubiHSM is designed to protect the YubiKey AES
keys when an authentication server is compromised by encrypting the AES keys
using a master key stored inside the YubiHSM.
In addition, the YubiHSM can decrypt an indefinite number of YubiKey’s
OTP’s with secure storage of the AES keys on the host computer. The AES
keys are only readable to the YubiHSM through the use of Authenticated Encryp-
tion with Associated Data (AEAD). The AEAD uses a cryptographic method
that provides both confidentiality and authenticity. An AEAD consists of two
parts: (i) the encryption of a message using the counter mode cryptographic
mode of operation, and (ii) a message authentication code (MAC) taken over
the encrypted message. In order to construct, decrypt or verify an AEAD, a
symmetrical cryptographic key and a piece of associated data are required. This
associated data, called a nonce in the rest of the paper, can either be a uniquely
generated handle or something that is uniquely related to the AEAD.
To encrypt a message using counter mode, one first divides it into blocks of
equal length, each suitable for input to the block cipher AES, e.g. data1 , . . . , datan .
The sequence counter1 , . . . , countern is then computed, where counteri = nonce⊕
i modulo 2η where η is the length of a block in bits. The encrypted message is
then senc(counter1 , k)⊕ data1 ; . . . ; senc(countern , k)⊕ datan , where senc is the
encryption function and k the symmetrical cryptographic key, and
senc(counter1 , k); . . . ; senc(countern , k) is called the keystream. Finally, the MAC
is computed over the encrypted message and appended to obtain
(senc(counter1 , k) ⊕ data1 ; . . . ; senc(countern , k) ⊕ datan); MAC . The MAC is
of fixed length, so it is possible to predict where it starts in an AEAD. However,
since the two attacks considered below do not involve most of the details about
block cipher AES, we follow the generalization of [14] and consider just messages
of the form senc(cmode(nonce), k)⊕ data; mac(data, k).
In [14, 15], Ku¨nnemann and Steel reported two kinds of attacks on version
0.9.8 beta of YubiHSM API: (a) if the intruder has access to the sever running
YubiKey, where AES keys are generated, then it is able to obtain plaintext in
the clear; (b) even if the intruder has no access to the server running YubiKey,
it can use previous nonces to obtain AES keys.
The first attack involves the YubiHSM API command depicted in Figure 5,
which takes a handle to an AES key and the nonce and applies the raw block
cipher.
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Fig. 5. YubiHSM Block Encrypt API Command
In order to perform this attack, the intruder compromises the server to learn
a AEAD and the key-handle used to produce it. Then, using the Block En-
crypt command shown in Figure 5, an intruder is able to decrypt an AEAD by
recreating the blocks of the key-stream: inputting counteri (the nonce) to the
YubiHSM Block Encrypt API command. The intruder exclusive-ors the result
with the AEAD truncated by the length of the MAC and obtains the plaintext.
The second attack involves the YubiHSM command depicted in Figure 6 that
takes a nonce, a handle to an AES key and some data and outputs an AEAD.
An intruder can produce an AEAD for the same handle kh and a value nonce
that was previously used to generated another AEAD. An intruder can recover
the keystream directly by using the AEAD-Generate command to encrypt a
string of zeros and discarding the MAC. The result will be the exclusive-or of
the keystream with a string of zeros, which is equal to the keystream itself. This
attack is worse than the first one, because this command cannot be avoided or
restricted (see [14] for further details).
Fig. 6. YubiHSM AEAD Generate API Command
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4 Maude-NPA
In Maude-NPA, as in most formal analysis tools for cryptographic protocols, a
protocol is a set of rules that describe the actions of honest principals commu-
nication across a network controlled by an intruder. Given a protocol P, states
in Maude-NPA are modeled as elements of an initial algebra TΣP/EP , where
ΣP = ΣSS ∪ ΣC is the signature defining the sorts and function symbols (ΣC
for the cryptographic functions and ΣSS for all the state constructor symbols),
EP = EC ∪ESS is a set of equations where EC specifies the algebraic properties
of the cryptographic functions and ESS denotes properties of constructors of
states. The set of equations Σε may vary depending on different protocols, but
the set of equations ESS is always the same for all protocols. Therefore, a state
is an EP -equivalence class [t]EP ∈ TΣP/EP with t a ground ΣP -term, i.e. a term
without variables.
In Maude-NPA a state pattern for a protocol P is a term t of sort State
which has the form {S1 & · · · &Sn & {IK}}, where & is an infix associative-
commutative union operator with identity symbol ∅. Each element in the set is
either a strand Si or the intruder knowledge {IK} at that state.
The intruder knowledge {IK} belongs to the state and is represented as a
set of facts using comma as an infix associative-commutative union operator
with identity element empty. There are two kinds of intruder facts: positive
knowledge facts (the intruder knows m, i.e., m ∈ I), and negative knowledge
facts (the intruder does not yet know m but will know it in a future state, i.e.,
m /∈ I), where m is a message expression.
A strand [11] specifies the sequence of messages sent and received by a
principal executing the protocol and is represented as a sequence of messages
[msg±1 ,msg
±
2 ,msg
±
3 , . . . ,msg
±
k−1,msg
±
k ] with msg
±
i either msg
−
i (also written
−msgi) representing an input message, or msg+i (also written +msgi) repre-
senting an output message. Note that each msgi is a term of a special sort Msg.
Variables of a special sort Fresh are used to represent pseudo-random values
(nonces) and Maude-NPA ensures that two distinct fresh variables will never be
merged. Strands are extended with all the fresh variables f1, . . . , fk created by
that strand, i.e., :: f1, . . . , fk :: [msg
±
1 ,msg
±
2 , . . . ,msg
±
k ] .
Strands are used to represent both the actions of honest principals (with a
strand specified for each protocol role) and the actions of an intruder (with a
strand for each action an intruder is able to perform on messages). In Maude-
NPA strands evolve over time; the symbol | is used to divide past and future.
That is, given a strand [ msg±1 , . . . , msg
±
i | msg±i+1, . . . , msg±k ], messages msg±1 ,
. . . ,msg±i are the past messages, and messages msg
±
i+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are the future
messages (msg±i+1 is the immediate future message). A strand [msg
±
1 , . . . ,msg
±
k ]
is shorthand for [nil | msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k , nil]. An initial state is a state where the
bar is at the beginning for all strands in the state, and the intruder knowledge
has no fact of the form m ∈ I. A final state is a state where the bar is at the end
for all strands in the state and there is no intruder fact of the form m /∈ I.
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Since the number of states in TΣP/EP is in general infinite, rather than ex-
ploring concrete protocol states [t]EP ∈ TΣP/EP , Maude-NPA explores symbolic
state patterns [t(x1, . . . , xn)]EP ∈ TΣP/EP (X ) on the free (ΣP , EP)-algebra over
a set of variables X . In this way, a state pattern [t(x1, . . . , xn)]EP represents
not a single concrete state (i.e., an EP -equivalence class) but a possibly infinite
set of states (i.e., an infinite set of EP -equivalence classes), namely all the in-
stances of the pattern [t(x1, . . . , xn)]EP where the variables x1, . . . , xn have been
instantiated by concrete ground terms.
The semantics of Maude-NPA is expressed in terms of rewrite rules that de-
scribe how a protocol transitions from one state to another via the intruder’s
interaction with it. One uses Maude-NPA to find an attack by specifying an inse-
cure state pattern called an attack pattern. Maude-NPA attempts to find a path
from an initial state to the attack pattern via backwards narrowing (narrow-
ing using the rewrite rules with the orientation reversed). That is, a narrowing
sequence from an initial state to an attack state is searched in reverse as a back-
wards path from the attack state to the initial state. Maude-NPA attempts to
find paths until it can no longer form any backwards narrowing steps, at which
point it terminates. If at that point it has not found an initial state, the at-
tack pattern is judged unreachable. Note that Maude-NPA places no bounds on
the number of sessions, so reachability is undecidable in general. Note also that
Maude-NPA does not perform any data abstraction such as a bounded num-
ber of nonces. However, the tool makes use of a number of sound and complete
state space reduction techniques that help to identify unreachable and redundant
states, and thus make termination more likely.
4.1 Modeling Mutable Memory by means of Maude-NPA Strand
Compositions
Strands can be extended with synchronization messages [22] of the form {Role1 →
Role2 ; ; mode ; ; w} where Role1, Role2 are constants of sort Role provided
by the user, mode can be either 1-1 or 1-* representing a one-to-one or one-
to-many synchronization (whether an output message can synchronize with
one or many input messages), and w is a term representing the information
passed along in the synchronization messages. Synchronization messages are lim-
ited to the beginning and/or end of a strand. Although originally intended for
a different use, they are very useful for representing a strand of unspecified
length as a concatenation of different fixed-length strands. For example, con-
sider a module that receives i pieces of data, and then exclusive-ors them, i.e.,
[−(M1), . . . ,−(Mi),+(M1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Mi)] for i ≥ 1. This can be specified using
three strands using synchronization messages:
1. [ −(M1), {role⊕ → role⊕ ; ; 1-1 ; ; M1} ]
2. [{role⊕ → role⊕ ; ; 1-1 ; ; M},−(M2), {role⊕ → role⊕ ; ; 1-1 ; ; (M ⊕M2)}]
3. [{role⊕ → role⊕ ; ; 1-1 ; ; M},+(M) ]
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Composition is then performed by unifying output synchronization messages
with input synchronization messages of instances of strands.
For the YubiKey and YubiHSM APIs, if each event is represented by a strand,
then an execution (e.g., Plugin followed by Press followed by Login) can be
represented by the concatenation of the strands associated to the execution.
However, the YubiKey and YubiHSM APIs also require different information to
be stored from one API command to the next. Some information is read-only, but
other information is updated, such as the YubiCounter(pid,counter). Maude-
NPA, unlike Tamarin, does not natively support mutable memory; but it can be
modeled using synchronization messages. That is, the old data will appear in the
input synchronization message of an API strand, and the new information will
appear in the output synchronization message of that strand, which will then
become the input synchronization message of the next API strand.
We model the mutable memory used by YubiKey as a multiset of predicates,
where we define a new multiset union symbol @, which is an infix associative-
commutative symbol with an identity symbol empty. Thus, for the strand de-
scribing the YubiKey button press, the input synchronization message is as fol-
lows:
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; Y(pid,sid) @ YubiCounter(pid,c1) @
Server(pid,sid,c2) @ SharedKey(pid,k)}
Updating the counter of the YubiKey after a button press is represented by up-
dating the second argument of the YubiCounter(pid,c1) predicate in the mul-
tiset. This updated multiset becomes the output synchronization of the strand.
4.2 Modeling Event Lists by means of Mutable Memory
The YubiKey and YubiHSM APIs also keep a rigid control of the ordering of
events, where an event is a state transition in the system, and a proper analysis
of actions is mandatory. Maude-NPA, unlike Tamarin, does not natively support
the representation and analysis of event sequences; but we have implemented it
by storing event sequences in the synchronization messages. This is helped by
the fact that Maude-NPA, via the Maude language, has recently been endowed
with built-in lists (using any associative symbol). We have defined a new infix
associative symbol ++ with an identity symbol nil to represent an event list
and also a new auxiliary infix symbol |> where the left-hand side contains the
mutable memory and the right-hand side contains the event list. The input
synchronization message for the button press strand has the form:
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; Y(pid,sid) @ YubiCounter(pid,c1) @
Server(pid,sid,c2) @ SharedKey(pid,k) |> Plugin(pid,c3) ++ Press(pid,c4)}
Every time a new event occurs, it is inserted as a new element at the end of
the event list. The leftmost elements are the oldest ones, whereas the rightmost
elements are the newest. Thus, if we want to say that event e1 must occur before
event e2, we can express this with the event list L1 ++ e1 ++ L2 ++ e2 ++ L3.
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4.3 Modeling Lamport Clocks in Maude-NPA Using Constraints
Lamport clocks require the testing of constraints: that is, whether one counter
is smaller than another. This is simple to do when the counters have concrete
values. However, since Maude-NPA does not consider concrete protocol states
but symbolic state patterns (terms with logical variables), the equality and dise-
quality constraints handled by Maude-NPA are predicates defined over variables,
whose domain, in the case of Lamport clocks, is the natural numbers.
In Maude-NPA strands can be extended with equality and disequality con-
straints [10] of the form Term1 eq Term2 and Term1 neq Term2. Whenever an
equality constraint is found during the execution of a strand, the two terms in
the equality constraint are unified modulo the set EP of equations of the proto-
col and a new state is created for each possible unifier. Whenever a disequality
constraint is found during the execution of a strand, it is simply stored in an
internal repository of disequality constraints associated to each protocol state;
but every time a new state is going to be generated during the state space ex-
ploration, all the disequality constraints in the internal repository are tested for
satisfiability [10]. That is, for each state, if there is a disequality constraint of
the form Term1 neq Term2 such that Term1 and Term2 are equal modulo EP
then the state is discarded.
We deal with Lamport clocks symbolically by representing the relations be-
tween clocks as constraints in Presburger Arithmetic. Although various Satisfia-
bility modulo theories (SMT) [20] solvers such as CVC45, Yices6, and Microsoft
Z37 could be used for this purpose, we decided to avoid the complexities of in-
voking an external tool while executing Maude-NPA. Instead, we have used the
variant-based decision procedure for Presburger Arithmetic already available in
Maude [19]; but considered only positive numbers without zero.
Adding two natural numbers i and j is written as i + j. Checking whether
a natural number i is smaller than another natural number j is represented in
Maude-NPA by a constraint of the form j eq i + k, where k is a new variable.
5 Formal Specifications in Maude-NPA
5.1 Formal Specifications of YubiKey in Maude-NPA
In our specification, each command of the YubiKey API (Figures 2, 3, and 4)
plus the initialization is specified in Maude-NPA as a strand.
The initialization strand is defined as follows. Three new Fresh values are
defined: a YubiKey public ID (rpid), a secret ID (rsid), and a key ‘rk’ shared
with the server. Variables of sort Fresh are wrapped by symbol Fr as in [14].
:: rk,rpid,rsid ::
[ +(init),
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;;
YubiCounter(Fr(rpid), 1) @ Server(Fr(rpid),Fr(rsid),1) @
Y(Fr(rpid),Fr(rsid)) @ SharedKey(Fr(rpid),Fr(rk))
|> Init(Fr(rpid),Fr(rk)) ++ ExtendedInit(Fr(rpid),Fr(rsid),Fr(rk))}]
5 Available at http://cvc4.cs.stanford.edu/web/.
6 Available at http://yices.csl.sri.com.
7 Available at https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3.
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The API command represented in Figure 2 shows what happens when a
YubiKey is being plugged in. This command checks that the new received counter
is smaller than the previous one and updates the predicate YubiCounter.
:: nil ::
[{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; YubiCounter(pid,otc) @ mem |> EL },
-(tc), (tc eq (otc + extra)),
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; YubiCounter(pid,tc) @ mem |> EL ++ Plugin(pid,tc)} ]
Note that the parameter mem denotes the rest of the mutable memory and the
parameter EL denotes the previous event list. The variable extra is an auxiliary
variable used just for testing the numerical constraint.
The command shown in Figure 3 represents what happens when the YubiKey
button is pressed and the OTP is sent. The OTP is represented by message:
senc(sid ; tc ; Fr(rnpr),k) where senc denotes symmetric encryption using
key k and the infix symbol ; denotes message concatenation.
:: rnpr,rnonce ::
[{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;;
YubiCounter(pid,tc) @ Y(pid,sid) @ SharedKey(pid,k) @ mem |> EL },
-(tc),
+(pid ; Fr(rnonce) ; senc(sid ; tc ; Fr(rnpr),k)),
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;;
YubiCounter(pid,tc + 1) @ Y(pid,sid) @ SharedKey(pid,k) @ mem |> EL ++ YubiPress(pid,tc)}]
Finally, the command shown in Figure 4 represents what happens when the
server receives a login request. This request is accepted if the counter inside the
encryption is larger than the last counter stored on the server.
:: nil ::
[ {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; Server(pid,sid,otc) @ SharedKey(pid,k) @ mem |> EL },
-(pid ; nonce ; senc(sid ; tc ; pr, k)), -(otc), (tc eq (otc + extra)),
{yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; Server(pid,sid,tc) @ SharedKey(pid,k) @ mem
|> EL ++ Login(pid,sid,tc,senc(sid ; tc ; pr, k)) ++ LoginCounter(pid,otc,tc) } ]
5.2 Formal Specification of YubiHSM in Maude-NPA
We consider only the two commands shown in Figures 5 and 6. Each command is
specified in Maude-NPA as a strand. YubiHSM makes extensive use of exclusive-
or, denoted by the symbol ∗, which satisfies the following equations:
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z (associativity)
x ∗ y = y ∗ x (commutativity)
x ∗ null = x (identity element)
x ∗ x = null (self-cancellation)
The YubiHSM command of Figure 5 is defined as follows.
:: nil ::
[ {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem |> EL },
-(kh), -(nonce),
+(senc(cmode(nonce),k)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem |> EL ++ SEnc(kh,nonce) } ]
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We use two alternative definitions of the YubiHSM command of Figure 6,
one to represent what happens when the command processes plaintext from the
intruder, and another to represent what happens when the command processes
plaintext from a legitimate principal. This is possible because, unlike in the
traditional Dolev-Yao model, honest principals communicate with the YubiHSM
devices directly, not through the intruder. This means that we can represent an
honest principal’s input data as internal to the system. Moreover, in this instance
such a representation is necessary, since we are asking whether the intruder can
learn the input data. We maximize the intruder’s advantage, however, by giving
it control over the other input data.
The following strand represents the intruder learning an honest principal’s
input plaintext data. We assume the plaintext data is a Fresh value. In this way,
we can later ask whether the intruder is able to learn that Fresh value. We use
the following macro: aead(n,k,d) = (senc(cmode(n),k) * d) ; mac(d,k).
:: data ::
[ {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem |> EL },
-(kh), -(nonce),
+(aead(nonce,k,Fr(data))),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem
|> EL ++ GenerateAEAD(Fr(data),aead(nonce,k,Fr(data)))}]
In the second strand, we replace the Fresh value (data) associated to the
plaintext data by an input from the intruder.
:: nil ::
[ {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem |> EL },
-(data), -(kh), -(nonce),
+(aead(nonce,k,data)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(kh,k) @ mem
|> EL ++ GenerateAEAD(data,aead(nonce,k,data)) }]
6 Experiments
We have been able to prove secrecy and authentication properties of YubiKey
and to find both attacks on YubiHSM:
(a) Absence of replay attacks in YubiKey, i.e., there are no two distinct logins
that accept the same counter value.
(b) Correspondence between pressing the button on a YubiKey and a successful
login. In other words, a successful login must have been preceded by a button
pressed for the same counter value.
(c) Counter values of YubiKey are different over time, where a successful login
invalidates previous OTPs.
(d) If the intruder has access to the sever running YubiKey, where the YubiHSM
AES keys are generated, then it is able to obtain plaintext in the clear.
(e) If the intruder has no access to the server running YubiKey, it can use
previous YubiHSM nonces to obtain AES keys.
Table 1 summarizes the result of the analyses of the YubiKey and YubiHSM
APIs specified in Maude-NPA showing the number of generated nodes in each
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Attack Pattern
Depth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
YubiKey (a) 4 4 9 21 88 160 0
YubiKey (b) 4 7 16 14 2 2 5 0
YubiKey (c) 4 4 6 18 55 80 0
YubiKey Login 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1(1)
YubiHSM (d) 1 2 3 4 7 13 24 40 76(1)
YubiHSM (e) 4 6 11 26(1)
Table 1. Output YubiKey and YubiHSM Experiments
step. The notation “(1)” represents that the tool found 1 solution to the question
asked by the attack pattern. When the number of generated nodes is 0, the attack
pattern is unreachable.
Appendix A provides the specific attack patterns. All the details on how
the attack patterns are specified and which was the output returned by Maude-
NPA are available at http://safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/9TCvkSDp. The anal-
yses were completely automatic and we obtained finite search graphs for all
the attack patterns. This was achieved thanks to the use of event list expres-
sions within the attack patterns and the variant-based SMT solving for Lam-
port clocks. Note that Maude-NPA uses a full specification of exclusive-or, an
unbounded session model, and an active Dolev-Yao intruder model. Moreover,
it does not perform any data abstraction such as a bounded number of nonces,
so there are no false positives or negatives.
7 Related Work
There is a vast amount of research on the formal analysis of APIs, so in this
related work section we will concentrate on the work that is closest to ours,
namely, the formal analysis of the YubiKey and YubiKey-like systems. Further
related work on APIs and exclusive-or can be found in [12,13].
Besides the work on formalizing and verifying YubiKey that we have already
discussed, there has been further work focused on building tools for analyzing
policies for YubiKey and YubiKey-like systems.
In [2], Yubico presents some security arguments on their website. An inde-
pendent analysis was given by blogger Fredrik Bjo¨rck in 2009 [6,7], raising issues
that Yubico responded to in a subsequent post. Oswald, Richter, et al. [21] an-
alyze the YubiKey, generation 2, for side-channel attacks. They show that non-
invasive measurements of the power consumption of the device allow retrieving
the AES-key within approximately one hour of access. The authors mentioned a
more recent version of the YubiKey, the YubiKey Neo which employs a certified
smart-card controller that was designed with regard to implementation attacks
and is supposed to be more resilient to power consumption analysis.
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Ku¨nnemann et al. [14] performed a deep analysis of the different properties of
YubiKey, but unlike our analysis using the Maude-NPA tool, they needed to use
different lemmas to check some properties that cannot be done automatically by
the Tamarin prover, whereas these properties can be checked out in an automatic
way by the Maude-NPA tool. Some properties were not proved due to limited
support for exclusive-or.
Mutable global state memory can be used in protocols that provide end-
to-end encryption for instant messaging [8] as well as at the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) [9] that is a hardware chip designed to enable commodity com-
puters to achieve greater levels of security than is possible in software alone.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have described the analyses of the YubiKey generation 2 and
the version 0.9.8 of the YubiHSM in Maude-NPA. This allowed us to perform the
analysis of these APIs in a fully-unbounded session model making no abstraction
or approximation of fresh values, and with no extra assumptions. Ku¨nnemann
and Steel used the Tamarin Prover [17] to prove secrecy and authentication
properties of YubiKey and to find the first attack on YubiHSM, but could not
find the second attack on YubiHSM due to the limited use of exclusive-or in the
version of Tamarin used in [14]. We consider our work as complementary to the
work of Ku¨nnemann and Steel.
The main challenges involved in modeling and analyzing YubiKey and Yu-
biHSM are: (1) handling of Lamport clocks, (2) modeling of mutable memory, (3)
handling of constraints on the ordering of events, and (4) support for symbolic
reasoning modulo exclusive or. Very few tools are well equipped to simultane-
ously handle all of these challenges.
To the best of our knowledge, the most advanced formal modeling and anal-
yses of YubiKey and YubiHSM properties carried out so far is the one in [14],
which uses the Tamarin tool [17]. Tamarin was well-equipped to handle Chal-
lenges (1)-(3), but the analysis is incomplete due to the limited support of
Tamarin for symbolic reasoning modulo exclusive or in [14]. The main goal of
this work has been to investigate whether Maude-NPA could complement and
extend the formal modeling and analysis results about YubiKey and YubiHSM
obtained so far. This is a non-obvious question: on the one hand, Maude-NPA
fully supports reasoning modulo exclusive or, so it is well-suited for meeting
challenge (4). But on the other hand, previous applications of Maude-NPA have
not addressed Challenges (1)-(3). The main upshot of the results we present can
be summarized as follows: (a) Challenges (2) and (3) can by met by expressing
mutable memory and events in terms of synchronization messages, a notion used
in Maude-NPA to specify protocol compositions [22], and (b) Challenge (1) can
be met by a slight extension of Maude-NPA’s current support for equality and
disequality constraints [10], namely, by adding also support for constraints in
Presburger Arithmetic. In this way, we show how challenges (1)-(4) can all be
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met by Maude-NPA, and how these results in formal analyses of YubiKey and
YubiHSM that substantially extend previous analyses.
What remains to be seen is how generally applicable these tools are to Yu-
biKey and similar APIs. We note that previous work on analyzing API protocols
in Maude-NPA did not achieve termination of the search space: the IBM CCA
API in [12] and the PKCS#11 in [13]. In this work we have been able to achieve
termination of many properties thanks to the use of Lamport clocks, mutable
memory, and event lists. But more secure API case studies are needed to further
test and advance the techniques presented here.
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A Experiments
A.1 Absence of replay attacks in YubiKey
The first property to prove is the absence of replay attacks, where there are no
two distinct logins that accept the same counter value. This property is specified
in Maude-NPA as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(1)
= :: nil ::
[ nil, {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; mem |>
EL1 ++ Login(pid,sid,counter2,X) ++ EL2 ++ Login(pid,sid,counter2,Y) ++ EL3 } | nil ]
|| empty || nil || nil || nil [nonexec] .
The output of this attack shows that an initial state cannot be reached and, since
there is a finite search space, this property is secure under these circumstances.
The number of generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the “YubiKey
(a)” row of Table 1.
A.2 Correspondence in YubiKey
The second property represents a correspondence between pressing the button
on a YubiKey and a successful login. A successful login must have been preceded
by a button pressed for the same counter value. That is, we are searching for
EL1++ Login(pid,sid,1 + c4,Y) ++ EL2 with the condition that EL1 is not
of the form EL3 ++ Yubipress(pid,1 + c4) ++ EL4, which is defined by the
never pattern below. This property is specified in Maude-NPA as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(2)
= :: nil ::
[ nil, {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; mem |> EL1 ++ Login(pid,sid,1 + c4,Y) ++ EL2 } | nil ]
|| empty || nil || nil
|| never (
:: nil ::
[ nil | {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; mem |>
EL1a ++ YubiPress(pid,1 + c4) ++ EL1b ++ Login(pid,sid,1 + c4,Y) ++ EL2}, nil ]
& S:StrandSet || K:IntruderKnowledge) [nonexec] .
The output of this attack shows that an initial state cannot be reached and, since
there is a finite search space, this property is secure under these circumstances.
The number of generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the “YubiKey
(b)” row of Table 1.
A.3 Counter value control in YubiKey
The last property of YubiKey represents the control of the counter values, that
requires that if two logins occur with the same pid, the counter of the first one
should be less than the counter of the second one.
Note that the verification of this property in Tamarin [14] requires additional
user-defined lemmas. This property is specified in Maude-NPA as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(3)
= :: nil ::
[ nil, {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; mem |>
EL1 ++ LoginCounter(pid,c1,c2 + c4) ++ EL2 ++ LoginCounter(pid,c3,c4) ++ EL3 } | nil ]
|| empty || nil || nil || nil [nonexec] .
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The output of this attack shows that an initial state cannot be reached and,
since there is a finite search space, it is secure under these circumstances. The
number of generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the “YubiKey (c)”
row of Table 1.
A.4 A Regular Execution in YubiKey
Finally, we specified an attack pattern that represents a regular login sequence
of the YubiKey API. The specification is as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(0) =
:: nil ::
[nil, {yubikey -> yubikey ;; 1-1 ;; mem |>
Init(pid,k) ++ ExtendedInit(pid,sid,k) ++ YubiPress(rpid,1) ++
Login(pid, sid, (1 + 1),senc(sid ; (1 + 1) ; npr, k)) ++ LoginCounter(pid,1,1 + 1) }
| nil ] || empty || nil || nil || nil [nonexec] .
The output of the execution of this attack pattern in Maude-NPA shows that
Maude-NPA finds an initial state, showing that it is possible to perform a regular
login. The number of generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the
“YubiKey Regular Execution” row of Table 1.
A.5 First Attack on YubiHSM
In this attack, the intruder has access to the server where YubiKey AES keys are
generated. The intruder can extract the plaintext sent within an AEAD if it was
able to listen to a previous call to the command of Figure 5. The Maude-NPA
specification is as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(1) =
:: kh, k ::
[nil, +(Fr(kh:Fresh)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(Fr(kh),Fr(k)) @ YSM-AEAD(Fr(kh))
|> MasterKey(Fr(k))} | nil ]
&
::: data ::
[nil, {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(Fr(kh),Fr(k)) @ YSM-AEAD(Fr(kh))
|> MasterKey(Fr(k)) ++ SEnc(Fr(kh),cmode(nonce))},
-(Fr(kh)), -(Fr(nonce)),
+(aead(cmode(nonce),Fr(k),Fr(data))) | nil ]
|| Fr(data) inI || nil || nil || nil [nonexec] .
The output of the execution of this attack in Maude-NPA shows that Maude-
NPA finds an initial state, proving the existence of this attack. The number of
generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the “YubiHSM (d)” row of
Table 1. The initial state found by the tool shows the attack
:: x1,x3 ::
[ nil |
+(Fr(x1)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x1)) @ HSM(Fr(x1), Fr(x3))
|> MasterKey(Fr(x3))}, nil] ) &
:: nil ::
[ nil | {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x1)) @ HSM(Fr(x1), Fr(x3))
|> MasterKey(Fr(x3))},
-(Fr(x1)), -(x2),
+(senc(cmode(x2), Fr(x3))),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x1)) @ HSM(Fr(x1), Fr(x3))
|> MasterKey(Fr(x3)) ++ SEnc(Fr(x1), x2)}, nil] &
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:: x0 ::
[ nil | {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x1)) @ HSM(Fr(x1), Fr(x3))
|> MasterKey(Fr(x3)) ++ SEnc(Fr(x1), x2)},
-(Fr(x1)), -(x2),
+((Fr(x0) * senc(cmode(x2), Fr(x3))) ; mac(Fr(x0), Fr(x3))), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil |
-((Fr(x0) * senc(cmode(x2), Fr(x3))) ; mac(Fr(x0), Fr(x3))),
+(Fr(x0) * senc(cmode(x2), Fr(x3))), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil |
-(senc(cmode(x2), Fr(x3))), -(Fr(x0) * senc(x2, Fr(x3))),
+(Fr(x0)), nil]
A.6 Second Attack on YubiHSM
In this attack [4], the YubiHSM command of Figure 6 can be used to decrypt a
previously generated AEAD. If an intruder:
1. can acquire a previously generated AEAD, together with the nonce value
used when generating the AEAD, and
2. can use a YubiHSM with the same key handle that generated the first AEAD
to generate a second AEAD with arbitrary nonce and plaintext,
then the intruder will be able to decrypt the plaintext from the first AEAD
using the YubiHSM. Furthermore, the intruder can extract any symmetric en-
cryption by calling the AEAD generate API call with data = 0. The Maude-NPA
specification is as follows:
eq ATTACK-STATE(2) =
:: kh, k ::
[nil, +(Fr(kh)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(Fr(kh),Fr(k)) @ YSM-AEAD(Fr(kh)) |> MasterKey(Fr(k)) }
| nil ]
&
:: nil ::
[nil, {YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; HSM(Fr(kh),Fr(k)) @ YSM-AEAD(Fr(kh)) |> MasterKey(Fr(k)) },
-(null), -(Fr(kh)), -(nonce),
+(aead(nonce,Fr(k),null)) | nil ]
|| senc(nonce,Fr(k)) inI || nil || nil || nil [nonexec] .
The output of the execution of this attack in Maude-NPA shows that Maude-
NPA finds an initial state, proving the existence of this attack on the YubiHSM
API. The number of generated states of this attack pattern is shown at the
“YubiHSM (e)” row of Table 1. The initial state found by the tool shows the
attack
:: x2,x0 :: [ nil |
+(Fr(x0)),
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x0)) @ HSM(Fr(x0), Fr(x2)) |> MasterKey(Fr(x2)) },
nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil |
{YubiHSM -> YubiHSM ;; 1-1 ;; YSM-AEAD(Fr(x0)) @ HSM(Fr(x0), Fr(x2)) |> MasterKey(Fr(x2)) },
-(null), -(Fr(x0)), -(x1),
+(senc(cmode(x1), Fr(x2)) ; mac(null, Fr(x2))), nil] &
:: nil :: [ nil |
-(senc(cmode(x1), Fr(x2)) ; mac(null, Fr(x2))),
+(senc(cmode(x1), Fr(x2))), nil]
According to the experiments reported in [15], it appears that Tamarin cannot
find the second attack due to the limited use of exclusive-or.
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